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Summary findings
According  to Myint's  "vent-for-surplus"  theory,  unused  land.  Under  Spanish  colonialism,  the  elite
development  of the economies  of Indonesia,  the  preempted  unused  land  in the Philippines  wholesale,
Philippines,  and Thailand  from  the  nineteenth  century  bifurcating  land  distribution  between  noncultivating
on took  natural  advantage  of large  tracts  of unused  landlords  and sharecroppers  in lowland  rice  areas,  and
"empty  land"  with  low population  density  and  abundant  between  plantation  owners  and wvage laborers  in upland
natural  resources  of the type  typically  found  in Southeast  areas.  In i'ndonesia,  the  Dutch  government  granted  long-
Asia and  Africa at the  outset  of Western  colonization.  term  leases  for  uncultivated  public  land  to foreign
When  these  economies  were  integrated  into  international  planters,  but  prevented  alienation  of cultivated  land  from
trade,  hitherto  unused  natural  resources  (primary  native  peasants,  to  avoid social  instability.
commodities  the  indigenous  people  had not  valued)  In Thailand,  concessions  were  granted  for  private  canal
became  the source  of economic  development,  building,  but  the  independent  kingdom  preserved  the
commanding  market  value  because  of high  import  tradition  of giving  land  to anyone  who  could  open  and
demand  in Western  economies.  cultivate  it. Relatively  homogeneous  land-owning
The  major  delta  of Chao  Phraya  River  was the  peasants  dominated  Thailand's  rural  sector.
resource  base of vent-for-surplus  development  with  rice  As frontiers  for  new cultivatioti  closed,  the  plantation
in Thailand;  tropical  rain  forests  filled  that  role  in  system's  initial  advantage  (large-scale  development  of
Indonesia  and  the  Philippines  with  respect  to the  land  and  infrastructure)  began  to  be outweighed  by its
production  of tropical  cash crops.  This basic  difference  need  to monitor  hired  labor.  The  peasant  system,  based
underlay  differences  in distribution  of farm  size:  the  on family  labor  needing  no  supervision,  allowed
unimodal  distribution  of peasants  or family  farms  in  Thailand's  share  of the world  market  in tropical  cash
Thailand  and the  coexistence  of peasants  and large  estate  crops  to grow,  as Indonesia  and  the  Philippines  lost their
farms  or plantations  specializing  in tropical  export  crops  traditional  comparative  advantage.  Moreover,  land
in Indonesia  and the  Philippines.  reform  in the  Philippines  made  land  markets  inactive,
Differences  in agrarian  development  were  also shaped  with  resulting  distortions  in resource  allocation  and
by different  policies  toward  the  elite's  preemption  of  serious  underinvestment  in agriculture.
This  paper  - a product  of Rural  Development,  Development  Research  Group  - is part  of a larger  effort  in the group  to
review  rural  development  in Asian countries.  Copies  of the  paper  are available  free  from  the World  Bank,  1818  H Street
NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.  Please contact  Pauline  Kokila,  room  MC3-510,  telephone  202-473-3716,  fax  202-522-
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1.  Introduction
Since the outbreak of the financial crisis in Thailand in July 1997, optimism has given way
lo pessimism on the development prospect of Southeast  Asian economies. Yet, the fact
remains that several economies in this region achieved extraordinarily high growth rates in
about four decades prior to the crisis. It is generally agreed upon that their high development
performance was supported by the success of agricultural modernization, popularly called the
" Green Revolution." It has recently become evident, however, that the potential of Green-
Revolution technology to increase food output has been exhausting with the result of an
emergence of a serious rice shortage in Indonesia, for example, at the very moment of the
recent economic crisis (Pingali, Hossain and Gerpacio 1997). For the past high-performing
c  conomies in Southeast Asia to return to the track of sustaLined  growth, it is necessary to
c,esign  policies to revitalize agriculture based on the positive analysis of its past success and
failure. Such a policy-oriented analysis will produce useful lessons to other developing
r.gions. To be useful, however, the analysis on current developments must be based on the
faill  grasp of environrmental  differences across major ecological zones within Southeast  Asia
as well as unique historical paths of Southeast  Asian economies since their integration with
the Western world. This paper aims to outline such an ecological and historical perspective.
In my perspective Southeast Asia can be classified into two major ecological zones: (a) the
continental part including Thailand, Vietnam and Myanmar and (b) the insular and peninsular
part (henceforth abbreviated as " the insular part") including Indonesia, Malaysia and the
Philippines. The former was characterized, among others, by major river deltas and the latter
by tropical rain forests. Before the 1  860s when new transportation technology integrated this
region with the rapidly industrializing West, people in Southeast  Asia lived on wet rice
p roduction in small valleys or shifting cultivation in upland forests. Much of major deltas and
thick rain forests were then unused for agricultural production. When this region was faced
3with growing demands from the West for tropical products, these unused land became the
basis of"  vent-for -surplus " growth, with deltas converted into paddyfields for commercial
rice production and rain forests converted to plantations for export cash crops.
Corresponding to different natures of production by crop, deltas continued to be dominated
by peasants or small family farms, while insular /peninsular areas were bifurcated between
peasants cultivating rice in small valleys and coastal plains on the one hand and large
plantations based on hired labor on the other. The different agrarian organizations were rooted
significantly in different ecological conditions. Equally significant were differences in land
policy across different political regimes. For example, the distribution of land ownership
became far more skewed in the Philippines under Spanish colonialism than in Indonesia under
Dutch colonialism, despite their both belonging to the insular part. Such differences in the
agrarian structure, which were formed along different historical paths under different
ecological conditions have had far-reaching influences on the performances of agricultural
development across Southeast Asia. This is the aspect that I intend to focus on in this paper.
While recognizing several important variables other than agrarian structure, including
government policies, in determining agricultural development perforrnance, the possibility
should not be neglected that the present policy choice may be significantly influenced by the
historical path in the formation of agrarian structure.
Following this introduction, Section 2 outlines the characteristics of resource endowments,
agrarian structures, growths in aggregate agricultural output and changes in the shares of
major export commodities in world markets in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, which
shall be interpreted in terms of the ecological and historical perspective to be developed later.
Section 3 reviews the process of vent-for-surplus development in Southeast Asia in the late
nineteenth to the early twentieth century. The critical roles of major river deltas in the
continental part of Southeast  Asia and tropical rain forests in the insular part are emphasized
as the resource base of this development, and the resultant trade pattern is identified. Section 4
investigates the evolution of different agrarian structures in the three economies in the vent-
for-surplus development process under different ecological conditions and political regimes. It
is emphasized that the preemption of uncultivated but cultivable land by the power elite was
the major force to have resulted in skewed land distributions. Section 5 tries to explain
4differential agricultural growth perfornances across Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand
in terms of the different agrarian structures. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the findings and
identifies research agenda for the future.
2. Recent Developments
Before advancing a historical perspective it should be useful to develop an overview of the
characteristics of resource endowments, agrarian structures and agricultural production
performances in the three economies under comparison in recent years.
Table 1 compares the endowments of land for agricultural production relative to population
and labor force. Land is measured here by area of " cropland " in my term, which is the sum
of areas of arable land ( area used for annual cropping ) and land under permanent crop in the
statistics of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Arable land is classified into "
lowland paddyfield " and " upland annual crop land". Data for these sub-categories of arable
land have not been enumerated in the FAO statistics that are mainly based on the census of
farm households.. It was only recently that the data of lo wland paddyfield area based mainly
on aerial photography began to be available in the officizal  reports of national statistical
agencies for some specific years, which are used for calculations in Table 1.1  The areas of
upland annual crop land are measured as differences between arable land and lowland
paddyfield areas.
Data in this table show that in per-capita terms croplanLd  area in Thailand is more than twice
as large than in Indonesia and the Philippines but only marginally larger in per-farm worker
terrns in 1996 .Cropland areas increased from 1965 to 1996 by about 20 percent in Indonesia,
40 percent in the Philippines and 60 percent in Thailand. In all the three economies, however,
the rates of expansion in cropland area were lower than the rates of growth in population and
Huke and Huke (1997) estimate paddyfield areas in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand in the mid 1990s as
being 9,441,000, 3,456,000 and 9,806,000 hectares , respectively, though they do not specify to which years
these data pertain. The substitution  of Hukes' estimates  for the data  used in Table I does not change  the
conclusion of this paper.
5agricultural labor force. The cropland endowment relative to population decreased from 1965
to 1996 by 15 percent in Thailand, whereas the rates of decrease were higher than 30 percent
in Indonesia and the Philippines. The land endowment relative to agricultural labor force
remained about the same in Thailand, while it decreased in Indonesia by about 30 percent and
about 10 percent in the Philippines. These data suggest that Thailand has been endowed with
relatively favorable conditions for expanding land cultivation frontiers until recently, as
compared with Indonesia and the Philippines.
In the context of this paper the important characteristic that distinguishes Thailand from
Indonesia and the Philippines is the high share of paddyfield area in total cropland, being
larger than 50 percent in Thailand as compared with only about 30 percent in Indonesia and
the Philippines in 1996. On the other hand, Indonesia and the Philippines are characterized by
the high shares of area under pernanent  crops amounting to more than 40 percent in contrast
to less than 20 percent in Thailand. Needless to say, permanent crops in these economies
consist mainly of tropical trees for cash crop production, such as coffee, coconuts and rubber.
Although the earlier data are not available of lowland paddyfield area, the basic characteristic
that the share of tree crop land was much higher in Indonesia and the Philippines than in
Thailand remained the same today as 30 years ago. These data reflect the ecological
difference between the continental part of Southeast Asia as represented by Thailand and the
insular part as represented by Indonesia and the Philippines. The continental part had major
river deltas almost exclusively used for wet rice production and the insular part was originally
covered by tropical rain forests which could profitably be converted into the plantations of
tropical cash crops.
The different types of agricultural production corresponding to different environmental
conditions gave rise to different agrarian structures in the continental part as compared with
the insular part. Common to cereal-producing areas in the world, Thai agriculture traditionally
dependent on rice has been characterized by the dominance of peasants or small family farms
as the organization of production. On the other hand, a significant portion of tropical cash
crop production has been carried out by plantations or large estate farms dependent on hired
labor, though many peasants have also grown cash crops. Table 2 compares the distribution of
farm sizes and the incidence of tenancy across Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand for the
6period  before the influence of Philippine land reform became significant.
In all the three economies small farms operating below 5 hectares were the majority
comprising of 70 to nearly 100 percent of farms and cultivating from 40 to 70 percent of
farmland. Large farms above 50 hectares, which were considered to be agribusiness
plantations, are negligible in number, but land under the operation of those estate farms was
14 percent in Indonesia and the Philippines, while that of Thailand was less than I percent.
As such, the agricultural sector in the insular part is bifurcated between peasants subsisting on
small parcels of land and large plantations with hired labor under the hierarchy of
inanagement, while that of the continental patt is characterized by the uni-modal distribution
of self-employed family farns.  These plantations were p:rivately  owned and managed in the
case of the Philippines, whereas those of Indonesia were mostly state enterprises expropriated
from Dutch planters after independence.
The incidence of tenancy also varied widely, distinctively higher in the Philippines than in
the other two, especially in terms of percentage of area under pure tenancy. What ecological
factors and historical processes would have resulted in such diflerent agrarian structures in
Southeast  Asia shall be the focus of this study.
Agricultural growth performances from 1965 to 1995 are compared in Table 3. In terms of
total agricultural output, the rates of growth in Indonesia and Thailand were about the same,
but in both per-capita and per-farm-worker  terms, Indonesia's growth rates were somewhat
higher. In those three measures the growth rates were the lowest in the Philippines. In terms of
output per hectare of cropland, Thailand's growth was much slower than Indonesia and
comparable to the Philippines. The slow growth of land productivity in Thailand resulted
partly because of a major expansion of cultivation frontier in the Northeast that is
characterized by poor soil and unstable rain fall, and partly because of the relatively low rate
in the diffusion of modem high-yielding rice varieties. 2
2  Short-statured  modern  varieties  were difficult  to grow  in flood-prone  areas  in the Chao  Phraya  Delta  as well as
in drought-prone  areas in the North East. Also,  farmers  diod not aclopt  modem varieties  much because  of the
low  valuation  of these  products  in the export  market  for Thailand.
7In terms of both environmental conditions and relative resource endowments, traditional
comparative advantage in agricultural production of Thailand lay in rice, and that of Indonesia
and Philippines lay in tropical cash crops. It is, therefore, no surprise to find in Table 4 that
Thailand was a major rice exporter (the world's largest) with its world market share
continuing to rise from 1961-65 to 1991-95, while Indonesia and the Philippines remained net
importers though their import margins were significantly reduced owing to the success of the
" Green Revolution." This success was especially great in Indonesia, accounting mainly for
the high rate of growth in aggregate agricultural output despite the relatively slow growth of
cropland area in this country (Tables I and 3).
Surprising is the rise of Thailand as the exporter of several tropical cash crops associated
with the decline of Indonesia and, more conspicuously,  that of the Philippines.  Sugar
represents a typical example. Thailand was a net importer of sugar before the Second World
War  and was barely self-sufficient in the early 1960s.  Nevertheless, Thailand rose to the third
largest exporter in the world next to Brazil and Australia in the I 990s. In contrast, Indonesia
and the Philippines, two traditional exporters of sugar in Asia almost completely lost its
significance in the international market. Thailand exceeded Indonesia in the export of rubber
and the Philippines in the export of pineapple products by the 1990s. Indonesia was able to
achieve a major increase in the world market share of coffee and also to maintain high shares
of palm oil and rubber.  The Philippines, on the other hand, was the loser in world competition
in most tropical cash crops in which traditional comparative advantage is supposed to lie,
especially after the 1970s. The strengthened competitive position of Thai agriculture and the
dwindled position of Philippine agriculture are unmistakable from the data.
As is well known, Indonesia and Thailand belonged to " high-performing economies" in the
East Asian economic miracle throughout the four decades ending in the outbreak of the
financial crisis in 1  997(World Bank 1993), while Philippine economy staggered especially in
the "lost decade" of the 1980s.  As the result, per-capita GNP in Thailand, which was about the
same as that of Philippines in the 1970s, became twice as large by the early 1990s. During the
same period Indonesia's GNP per capita increased from only about one half to about the same
level as the Philippines'. It should be reasonable to expect that the different performances of
agriculture among the three countries, as summarized in this section, should be one of major
8factors underlying different growth rate of their economies. The following sections aim to
identify ecological and historical determinants of agrarian structures, each unique in
Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, and discuss on how the different agrarian structures
might have been related to different agricultural and economic growth performances.
3. The Basis of Vent-for-  Surplus Development
As advanced in the introduction, one basic framework of my perspective is the
classification of Southeast Asia into the continental part and the insular part (including the
Malay Peninsular), characterizing the former by major river deltas and the latter by tropical
rain forests. Such characterization is a gross over-simplification, disregarding wide ecological
variations within each region.3  In Thailand for example, the major delta of Chao Pbraya
River encompasses only a part of the Central Plain, one of four regions in Thailand. The
North is characterized by small river valleys amidst hills and mountains rising toward the
Burmese-Chinese border, where irrigated rice farming can easily be practiced by tapping
small streams, on which early Thai dynasties were build. The Nfortheast  bordering with Laos
is characterized by undulated plateau with sporadic rainfall anci  poor soil, which had remained
as the last frontier until Lao migrants settled recently by means of risky rainfed farming. The
South toward the border of Malaysia has an environment similar to the insular part originally
covered by rain forest.
Ecological variations within the insular part are equally large. Especially pronounced is the
difference between Java (and Bali) and Outer Islands such as K<alimantan  and Sumatra in
Indonesia. While much of the latter area is typically covered by tropical rain forest, the
environment of Java is categorically different, as it is characterized by volcanic slopes with
fertile soil and steady water supply, which makes much of this area uniquely suited for
irrigated rice farming. The environment of the Philippines is largely similar to that of Outer
Islands in Indonesia but mixed with volcanic terrain similar to that of Java.
3 Descriptions on ecological and environmental conditions in Southeast Asia in this paper are mainly based on
Takaya (1985).
9Despite the large variations within each region, I would dare to characterize the
environment of the continental part by major river delta and that of the insular part by tropical
rain forest, because they were the basis of economic development in Southeast Asia from the
late nineteenth to the early twentieth century. The so-called "vent-for-surplus theory" by
Myint(1965; 1971, ch.5) focused on the process of development of "empty land" with low
population density, large tracts of unused land and abundant natural resources, typically found
in Southeast Asia and Africa at the outset of Western colonization . When these economies
were integrated into international trade, unused natural resources (hitherto having had no
value to indigenous people) began to command market value since they were found useful to
produce primary commodities of high export demand to Western economies. In this way,
hitherto-unused resources became the source of economic development. It was the deltas of
major rivers, such as Chao Phraya in Thailand, Irrawaddy in Myanmar and Mekong in
Vietnam that became the basis of vent-for-surplus development in the continental part of
Southeast Asia, while it was the land under rain forest that provided the development basis for
the insular part.
Major river deltas in the continental part were very flat and low relative to the sea level, so
that their surface is almost completely submerged by flood in rainy season while it dries up in
dry season with no reservoir to store water. As such, flood plains in the major deltas had
defied human settlement until the mid-nineteenth century, literally remaining empty land. It
was through the major civil engineering work to control flooding water that the deltas were
transformed into habitable and agriculturally  productive land. In Thailand the water control
work took the form of developing the network of canals connected with Chao Phraya River.
The canals guide flooding water more evenly over wider areas for rice production. Also, canal
banks provide flood-proof spaces on which farmers can settle.
Canal construction in the Chao Phraya delta was initiated by the government of
enlightened King Mongkut (Rama IV of the Chakri dynasty) shortly after the signing of the
so-called Bowring Treaty in 1855 that opened the kingdom to trade with the West. Soon,
rapid increases in foreign demand for Thai rice, which significantly raised both the price of
rice and the value of rice land, induced mobilization of private investment. As a major
builder of private canals, the Siam Canals Land and Irrigation Company was established by
10a group of influential courtiers and wealthy Chinese traders. The company secured
concession in 1889 to dig canals in a vast tract of swampy land in the northeast of Bangkok,
under the clause that the company is allowed to hold ownership over reclaimed land along
the canals. Its operation was managed by the Chinese business elite and construction work
was heavily based on Chinese migrant laborers hired on wage, unlike corvee labor used in
King's prior projects. However, farmers settled in reclaimed land as tenants were Thai, who
migrated from other regions 4. There is little doubt that'  opening of the Chao Phraya Delta
for rice production was the very basis of vent-for-surplus growth of Thai economy toward'
specialization in rice production in the late nineteenth century.  Although comparable data
are not available for earlier years, the area planted in rice in the Central Plain was as large
as 6.8 million rai ( one rai equals 0.16 hectare) or 85 percent of total rice area in the
kingdom in the 1905-9 period, which was larger than the national total of 5.8 million rai in
1850 (Ingram 1971, p.44). Opening of the Irrawaddy Delta and the Mekong Delta in the
development of Burmese and Vietnamese economies during the comparable period was no
less important than that of the Chao Phraya Delta.
A comparable role in vent-for-surplus development in the insular part of Southeast Asia was
played by tropical rain forest. Since long before the mid nineteenth century, rain forest had
long been the source of supply of valuable products for trade, such as cinnamon, clove, bird
nests, deer horn and hides. However, the high incidence of ma[laria  and other tropical diseases
defied human settlement inside thick tropical forest in low elevation. Typically,  native people
lived on sea coasts and occasionally entered the forests for colilection  and extraction of natural
products for sale to foreign traders or their agents who sailed to their coasts. It was in the late
nineteenth century that Western capital and entrepreneurship began to convert the forests into
plantations of tropical export crops, heavily relying on migrant.  labor from China. Before this
period there were attempts by Western colonial powers to collect tropical products from the
natives by tax and other coercive means, but it was largely after the mid nineteenth century
4  While  the corvee obligation  was replaced  by  tax in kind  or mone', slave:ry  was also phased  out gradually  over
the reigns of Kings Mongkut and Chulalongkom, ending  in abolishment  in 1905 (Ingram 1971, pp. 53-63
Feenyl 982,
ch. 6).  The elimination of slavery and the corvee should have been an important factor for allocating a greater
share of Thai labor  to rice cultivation.
11that Western colonizers by themselves began to produce export crops by organizing
plantations in Southeast  Asia.
Concurrent exploitations of continental deltas and insular forests were the result of greater
integration of Southeast Asia into world economy in the late nineteenth century. Much greater
integration than before resulted from (a) establishment of the free trade regime under the
hegemony of Britain and (b) revolution in ocean transportation. The free trade system was
imposed on native economies by force, either directly by Britain in its colonies or indirectly
by forcing liberalization on local sovereign and other colonial powers. By the Bowring Treaty,
Thailand conceded to Britain not only exterritoriality but also lost financial autonomy. Export
and import duties were fixed at the flat rate of three percent ad valorem, and internal taxes
such as exercise taxes, transportation tolls and even land taxes were not allowed to change by
the will of the kingdom alone. Public finance was carefully monitored by advisors from
Britain (Ingram 1955, ch.8). As such, the Kingdom of Siam for several decades after signing
the Bowring Treaty was almost like Britain's protectorate. The free trade system, both
internationally and internally, was imposed on the kingdom in a way similar to Britain's
colonies such as Burma and Malay.
Furthermore, Britain pressed on other Western colonies to adopt the free trade system. For
example, Spaniards' monopoly of re-export trade at Manila of Chinese goods to Mexico by
galleon ships were broken by the British occupation of Manila in 1762-64 during the Seven
Years' War,  with the result of opening up Manila to other nations' shipment and commerce.
Continued pressure of Britain underlay successive opening of other ports in the Philippines
until the mid nineteenth century (Larkin 1972).
The reason behind Britain's strong drive for free trade was its high manufacturing
production capacity established this country as "the Workshop  of the World" after the
Industrial Revolution. British industries sought markets for their products and sources of raw
material supplies. Having established the modern factory system that could produce industrial
products at lower costs than local cottage industries in the tropics, Britain found it
advantageous to trade their manufactured commodities for tropical agricultural products and
minerals for meeting import demands, compared with the forced collection of tropical
12commodities through tax and other means, which was commonly practiced by earlier
colonialism such as Spanish conquistadors in the Philippines and the Dutch East India
Company in Indonesia. This approach was soon followed by other Western nations as they
followed Britain in industrialization.
Corresponding to the expanded industrial production capacity, demands from the West for raw
materials for processing, such as cotton, rubber and tin became very large. Moreover, as the
level of income and wages rose, tropical delicacies such as pepper, coffee and tea hitherto
limited to the consumption of  high-income elite became commonly placed on the tables of
ordinary working people. Altogether, demands in the West for primary products from the
tropics became incomparably larger than before.
This tendency was further strengthened by major innovations in ocean transportation,
consisting of the introduction of steamship and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. These
two innovations were combined to reduce the transportation cost of commodities from
Bangkok to major ports in Europe such as London below that from Bangkok to Thailand's old
capital, Chiang Mai (Ingram 1971,  p.  115). Without such innovations it should have been
impossible for the bulky commodity like rice produced in Southeast  Asia to find market as far
as in Europe (Furnival 1948,pp.50,84-85).
While the innovations in ocean transportation reduced the prices of commodities from
Southeast Asia in the West,  they also reduced the prices of Western commodities in Southeast
Asia to a large extent. Thus, under the liberal trade regime in the late nineteenth century,
industrial commodities flowed into Southeast  Asia, out-competing local handicraft industries.
De-industrialization became a common feature in Southeast Asia (Resnick 1970). Thailand,
which used to be an exporter of cotton products before the 1  850s, quickly turned to be a major
importer (Ingram, 1971, ch.6). Correspondingly,  indigenous labor shifted from manufacturing
to primary production for export. This shift, together with migration of labor from China and
India, provided the basis of exploiting unused natural resources, such as major river deltas and
tropical rain forests, for vent-for-surplus development. An example to clearly illustrate the
impact of opening to international trade on specialization in primary production can be seen in
the development of sugar production in Negros, Philippines. Prior to the opening of nearby
Iloilo City as an international port inl855, Negros Island was sparsely populated and much of
13its area was uncultivated. After then, this island was rapidly transformed into sugar
plantations. Concurrently, local weaving industries surrounding Iloilo, which had hitherto
made textiles a major export item from this region, were brought into havoc by the inflow of
cheap British cloth (MaCoy 1982).
In the global trade system created in the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century the
exchange was not simply between industrial commodities in the West and primary
commodities in Southeast Asia. Rice produced in the continental part was originally brought
to Europe as cheap food for industrial laborers (some re-exported to Latin America). Later, as
plantations were developed in the insular part, demand for rice as the basic subsistence need
for plantation laborers expanded at the speed that could not be met by local supply.
Correspondingly,  the share of rice exported from the continental to the insular part within
Southeast  Asia increased. Thus, the trade flows emerged in this period were triangular - rice
produced from the continental part was brought to the insular part, and tropical cash crops
produced in the insular part by laborers fed on the imported rice were exported to Europe in
exchange for industrial products. In this triangular trade flow, comparative advantage dictated
for regional specialization. For example, sugar industry, which appeared to be a promising
industry for export in Thailand in the onset of trade opening, was soon destroyed by imports
from Indonesia and Philippines (Ingram 1971,ch.5). In this way, vent-for-surplus development
in Southeast Asia based on the exploitation of hitherto-unused land resources was reinforced
by comparative advantage within the region. 5
4. Evolution ofAgrarian  Systems
How this process of vent-for- surplus development would have influenced on the formation
of agrarian structures in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, as observed in Table 2, may
be summarized  as follow: (a) Thailand is characterized by the unimodal distribution of
peasants or family farms with large estate farms or plantations being insignificant and the
incidence of tenancy being relatively low, (b) Indonesia and the Philippines are characterized
5Comparative  advantage based on natural resource endowments was re-enforced by colonial policies on farm
lands (which shall be  discussed in  Section 4)  as  well  as  public investments in physical  and  institutional
infrastructure. For example,  the  increased international competitiveness of  sugar industry in Indonesia was
supported by a strong sugarcane research program organized by the Dutch colonial government (Evenson 1976).
14by bifurcation between the peasant sector growing mainly subsistence crops and the
plantation sector growing tropical cash crops, and (c) relative to the other two the incidence of
tenancy is high in the Philippines. Characteristics of (b) and (c) are combined to imply that the
share of landless population in the rural sector is the highest in the Philippines.
It is common to explain the persistence of the peasant mode in contrast to the emergence of
the plantation system in terms of different technological requirements for production between
subsistence food crops and export cash crops. However, in my perspective the bifurcated
farm-size distribution and the problem of landlessness in Southeast Asia (as well as in other
parts in the world) stemmed essentially from " preemption of land " by colonial and domestic
elite rather than technological factors for agricultural production.
4.1  Conditions of the  plantation system 6
In order to articulate this perspective it is necessary first to identify the factors underlying
the emergence of plantations.
A conventional explanation for the establishment of a plantation system is the scale
economies inherent in the production of tropical export crops (Baldwin 1956). However, the
crops subject to sufficiently strong scale economies at the farm level to make the use of the
plantation organization necessary are few (Pim 1946; Wickizer 1951, 1960; Lim 1968;
Hayami, Quisumbing, and Adriano 1990, chs. 5 and 67). In fact, one can find an example of
every so-called plantation crop being grown successfully by peasants somewhere in the world.
Significant increasing returns emerge only at the levels of processing and marketing
activities. The vertical integration of a large farm unit with a large-scale central processing
and/or marketing system is called for because of the need to supply farm-produced raw
materials in a timely schedule. A typical example is fermented "black tea." The manufacturing
This section draws on Hayami (1994; 1996).
Absence of scale economies in agriculture is also attested by the estimation of aggregate production functions
based on inter-country cross-section data (Hayami and Ruttan 1985,ch.5).
15of black tea at a standardized quality for export requires a modem machine plant into which
fresh leaves must be fed within a few hours after plucking (Wickizer 1951; 1960). The need
for close coordination between farm production and processing underlies the traditional use of
the plantation system for black tea manufacture. Unfermented "green tea," in contrast,
remains predominantly the product of peasants in China and Japan. 8
In the case of bananas for export, harvested fruits must be packed, sent to the wharf, and
loaded on a refrigerated boat within a day. A boatful of bananas that can meet the quality
standards of foreign buyers must be collected within a few days. Therefore, the whole
production process from planting to harvesting must be precisely controlled so as to meet the
shipment schedule. Although the plantation system has a decisive advantage for this exported
product, bananas for domestic consumption are usually produced by peasants.
On the other hand, for the crops for which centralized processing and marketing are not
necessary, plantations have no significant advantage over peasants. Typical examples are
cocoa and coconuts. The fermentation of cocoa and the drying and smoking of coconuts to
make copra can be handled in small lots with no large capital requirement beyond small
indigenous tools and facilities. These crops are grown predominantly by peasants.
Sugar is frequently cited as a classic case of scale economies stemming from the need of
coordination between farm production and large-scale central processing (Binswanger and
Rozenweig 1986). Efficient operation of a centrifugal sugar mill requires the steady supply of
a large amount of cane over time.  Coordination of production from planting to harvesting
with processing is required. This coordination, however, need not be as stringent as it is for
tea and bananas. The rate of sugar extraction decreases as the processing of cane is delayed,
8 Even for the manufacture of black tea is not imperative to use the plantation system as evident from the case of
Taiwan where smallholders have been used to produce both black and green tea with small-scale equipment.-The
large fermentation plant has been used by plantations as a device of enforcing work schedule and standardizing
product quality for the export market. In fact, farm production by smallholders based on the system of "contract
farming" (which shall be explained in Section 5.2) have recently been developing in Kenya (Lamb and Muller
1982).
16but this loss is in no way comparable to the devastating dama:ge  that delayed processing has
on the quality of tea and bananas for export. Sugar cane can be hauled from relatively long
distances and stored for several days. Therefore, the need for vertical integration is not as
large, and the necessary coordination can be achieved through contracts of a sugar mill with
cane growers on the time and the quota of cane delivery. In fact, an efficient sugar industry
with smallholders has developed in Australia, Taiwan and more recently in Thailand.
Another explanation for the use of the plantation system is the advantage of large estate
farms in accessing capital.  Because of this, it has been argued that plantations have an
advantage with regard to tree crops characterized by long gestation periods from planting to
maturity (Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986). However, the opportunity costs of labor and
capital applied to formation of the tree capital are not necessarily high for peasants. Typically,
they plant the trees in hitherto unused land. If such land is located near their residence, they
open new land for planting by means of family labor at low opportunity cost during the idle
season for the production of food crops on farm land already in use. When they migrate to
frontier areas, a typical process is to slash and burn jungles and plant subsistence crops such
as maize, potatoes and upland rice, together with tree seedlings. Such complex inter-cropping
is difficult to manage with hired labor in the plantation system, because of inherent difficulty
in monitoring the work of hired wage laborers over spatially dispersed and ecologically
variable farm operations (Brewster 1950; Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986; Hayami and
Otsuka 1993).
Therefore, even in the export boom of tropical cash crops under colonialism from the
nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, the plantation system failed to make inroads
in regions where indigenous population had established family farms (Lewis 1970, pp. 13-45).
Western traders found it more profitable to purchase tropical agricultural commodities from
peasant producers in exchange for imported manufactured cormmodities  than to produce the
tropical crops themselves by means of the plantation system.
The establishment of plantation in less-developed economies became a necessity when the
demand for tropical products by the industrialized nations continued to rise, while the regions
physically suited for the production of these products had no significant peasant population
17that could produce and trade their commodities. Opening frontier land for the production of
new crops entailed high capital outlays. Virgin land had to be cleared and developed, and
physical infrastructure, such as roads, irrigation systems, bridges, and docking facilities, had
to be constructed. Capital, in the form of machinery and equipment, had to be imported and
redesigned to adapt to local situations. Laborers were not only imported from the more
populous regions but also had to be trained in the production of these crops.
The establishment of plantations thus requires huge initial capital investment. For the
investors to internalize gains from investment in infrastructure, the farm size inevitably must
be large. Viewed from this perspective, it follows that the plantation system evolved not
because it was generally a more efficient mode of productive organization than the peasant
mode, but because it was the most effective type of agricultural organization for extracting the
economic benefit accruing from the exploitation of sparsely populated virgin areas, typically
in the process of vent-for-surplus development. From this perspective, it is easy to understand
why the same crop is grown mainly by peasants in one place and mainly by plantations in
another. For example, for sugar cane production the peasant mode is more common in old
settled areas of Luzon, and the plantation system predominates in the newly opened Negros,
both in the Philippines (Hayami, Quisumbing, and Adriano, 1990, ch.5). Usually the share of
peasants in the production of export cash crops rises as the initial land-opening stage is over
and infrastructure is decently established with increased population density (Booth 1988,
ch.6).
While recognizing the economic advantage of the plantation system in the vent-for-surplus
stage, plantations could not have been established unless concessions were granted to  hold
large tracts of virgin land for their exclusive use. Typically, such concessions were given by
colonial governments to Western planters. For example, the Dutch colonial government had
traditionally tried to prevent alienation of farmland from indigenous peasants by regulating
against land purchase by foreigners including ethnic Chinese. However, in the late nineteenth
century when demands for tropical cash crops rose sharply, by the Agricultural Land Law of
1870 the government granted Dutch planters  long-term contracts to lease in wild land, which
were dejure owned by the government (though defacto  used by native tribes) .While  this
new institutional arrangement should have accelerated the development of "empty land" for
18cash crop production, it served as an instrument to pree:mpt  land for the elite, closing
smallholders' land access. Similar public land-leasing arrangements were also practiced under
the American colonial administration in frontier land of the Philippines, especially in
Mindanao, which became the basis of large plantations under the management of
multinational corporations (Hayami, Quisumbing and Adriano 1990, ch.6).
4.2  Landpreemption and tenancy
The incidence of land tenancy is also closely related wilh the preemption of land. Of course,
land tenancy relationship can emerge as a practice among peasants in the absence of
preemption. If a rural community is not disturbed by exitemal  forces, land tenure institutions
would evolve gradually from communal to private ownership. Corresponding to the growing
relative scarcity of land under mounting population pressure, iit  becomes necessary to
intensify the utilization of land, typically from shifting cultivation with long furrow to that
with short furrow, to annual cropping and further to multiple cropping per year involving
irrigation a la Boserup(1965). The process of agricultural intensification required major
investment for improving land infrastructure, from removing stones and roots out of newly
opened land to land leveling and terracing, and further to irrigation and drainage. In order to
secure incentive for such investment it becomes necessary to give land users the right to use
their land exclusively.  Thus, land tenure institutions normally evolve from communal
ownership to private ownership, involving various steps from periodical re-allotment of
communal land among community members, to life-long usufruct rights, to usufruct rights
inheritable to heirs, and further to private property rights amerLable  for market transactions .
Land tenancy arrangements gradually develop as an institution to increase production
efficiency by improving combinations between land and labor (including entrepreneurship) as
individual land tenure becomes longer and more exclusi ve. When a farrmer  finds his family
labor short for cultivation of a land parcel on which a long-tenn usufruct is established ( for
sickness or some other reasons), he may rent out a part of it to someone whose land
endowment is short relative to labor endowment. It is a Pareto improvement if the latter pays
to the former a rent equivalent to the marginal productivity of land.  At the same time, land
tenancy associated with private property rights on land can work as an institution to increase
19inequality in income distribution and social hierarchy within community.  A farmer endowed
with superior muscular power or entrepreneurship may rent more land and increase income
and may eventually buy the land. As he eventually accumulates more land than his family
labor can efficiently cultivate, he may rent out a part of his land to someone who has become
landless for whatever reason. Increased income from rent revenue added to farm income may
motivate him to purchase more land for renting. This process should progress faster as the
relative scarcity of land rises under increased population pressure.
Such autonomous evolution of land property rights and tenancy relationships, however,
does not usually result in large-scale absentee landlordism as observed in several developing
economies. Rather it tends to create stratification of peasantry along a continuous spectrum
between landlord-cum-owner and owner-cum-tenant farmers. Although land tenancy is very
commonly practiced, a majority of farmland continues to be under owner cultivation, and both
non-cultivating landlords and pure tenants are the minority. Such an agrarian structure is
typically found in the peasant sector in Indonesia. Unlike other colonial powers, the Dutch did
not try to impose Western institutions such as private property rights in land. Rather it
preserved or even strengthened traditional community institutions and organizations. The
Agrarian Law of 1870 granted long-term lease of wild public land to foreign planters, as
explained before, but did not allow them to purchase or rent cultivated land from native
peasants individually. Instead, sugar planters were allowed to lease in rice land through
contracts with the heads of villages normally extending for less than 20 years. The lessee was
allowed to occupy only one third of the village land, which had to be rotated over three crop
seasons. This rotation was designed to prevent planters from gaining a permanent hold on
village land. Periodic reallocation of village land under the direction of village headmen
strengthened traditional tendencies toward communal landholding (Pelzer 1945, p.146).
A sharp contrast is found in the Philippines. The Spaniards introduced from the time of
conquest the notion of legal title to land (McLennan 1969). They applied to the Philippines
the same principle applied to other new territories-that  all land except those officially proved
to be private or communal possessions belonged to the Spanish crown. The crown's property
rights were established over vast areas of uncultivated land including areas used as commons
by native people. Much of the royal domain was granted to conquistadors and monastic orders
20such as Augustinian and Franciscan friars. This institutional development in the early Spanish
era represented a wholesale preemption of usable land closing access by native people. Later,
as the population increased and foreign demand for Philippine products increased through
trade liberalization, large landholdings created from earlier royal grants became the basis of
plantations in the case of upland and rice haciendas manned by tenants in the case of lowland.
However, native peasants had no access to land for them to open and establish ownership. For
example, when the inner part of Central Luzon that had been covered by jungle and used only
for cattle ranching was finally converted into large rice haciendas in the late nineteenth
century, many peasants migrated from the north with the belief that they had settled in no
man's land. After opening the jungle , they were visited by the agents of landowners and
notified to pay rents as tenants in haciendas (Hester and Mabun 1924).
Pervasive landlordism in the Philippines also rooted in relatively free land transactions
under the Spanish regime. Chinese and Chinese mestizos, who engaged in internal trade along
littorals where native peasants held traditional land rights, acquired land through money
lending using land as collateral. A common arrangement is that the borrower continued to
cultivate his land as a sharecropper of his creditor during the loan period and that, if unable to
pay the loan in the end of the loan period, the land title shifted to the creditor while the
borrower usually continued sharecropping (McLennan 1969). The scale of landholding
accumulated in this commercial process in the coastal area was typically much smaller than
that of hacienderos in the inner part of Central Luzon (Hayami and Kikuchil981, ch. 4). Thus,
before the Marcos land reform in the 1970s,  rice area in the P'hilippines  was predominantly
cultivated by share tenants, typically owning no land of their own. The pervasive landlordism
in the rice sector and plantations in the cash crop sector that characterized the traditional
agrarian structure in the Philippines were both rooted in the preemption of land in the Spanish
period.
In Thailand also, preemption occurred in the vent-for-surplus stage through granting of land
concessions to private canal builders in Chao Phraya Delta. As a result, the incidence of
tenancy is significant in the Central Plain, especially in the Rangsit area northeast of
21Bangkok, where canals were intensively dug by the private company 9. Yet, taking Thailand as
a whole, tenancy is of minor importance compared with Indonesia and the Philippines, partly
because of relatively abundant land endowment and more importantly because of government
policy. In this country it was the ancient custom to give every man the right to take as much
land from the state as he and his family could cultivate, which was considered normally to be
25 rai (equivalent to 4 hectares). This institution was maintained even after opening trade with
the West. The Consolidated Land Act of 1908 did not specify an exact area of land, but gave
people the right to take as much land as they could profitably cultivate. In practice these areas
ranged between 20 and 50rai. The Land Act of 1936 specified 50 rai as the maximum that one
could take.  By these laws access of ordinary Thai to land was kept wide openl.  The situation
was diametrically different from that of the Philippines. Both of these Thai laws incorporated
another old custom that the cultivator could receive title to the land only after he cultivated it
for three years. This clause together with the land taxation applied not only to cultivated but
9  It is important  to recognize  that the preemption  of potential  rice  land in Thailand  as well as in the Philippines
resulted  in the emergence  of large-scale  landlordism  but not in the formation  of plantations  based  on hired labor.
Large  holdings  of landlords  were usually  subdivided  into  small  parcels  for rice  cultivation  by the family  labor  of
landless  peasants  under  tenancy  contracts.  The owners  of large  tracts of rice land who established  titles through
land preemption,  such  as obtaining  concessions  for canal digging  in the Chao Phraya  delta, preferred  tenancy  to
plantation  operations. The reason may partly be explained  by the difficulty  of standardizing  tasks of rice
production  and,  hence,  of monitoring  the efforts  of workers. An equally  or perhaps  more  important  reason  is that
paddy  is storable  and  hence  the need of close  coordination  between  farm  production  and  processing/marketing  is
not necessary  unlike  the cases  of black  tea and  banana  for export,  as explained  before. Although  rice  milling  and
marketing  for export  involved  significant  scale  economies,  the operators  of this business  could secure  adequate
supply of paddy through  ordinary market  transactions.  As the result, they were dispensed  with the efforts  to
vertically  integrate  farm production  with processing  and marketing  by means of the plantation  system  or the
contract  farming  system. Therefore,  it may not be unreasonable  to postulate  the counter-factual  hypothesis  that,
if the nature  of rice milling  technology  were such as to require  close coordination  with paddy  production,  large
rice  plantations  would  have been  established  in the Rangsit  area in the process  of rent-for-surplus  development.
Outside  the newly  opened  delta  area, the practice  of tenancy  is fairy  common  in the old-settled  North  region.  The
agrarian  structure  in  the North  of Thailand,  which  did not experience  preemption,  is similar  to that of the peasant
sector in Indonesia  characterized  by a continuous  spectrum from landlord-cum-owner  to owner-cum-tenant
farmers.
10 All forest  lands  were de  jure  state-owned  but were de facto open-access,  except  valuable  teak forests  which
were an important  source  of the Kingdom's  revenue  (Feeny  1999,  p.43  1)
22also uncultivated holdings discouraged holding of land for speculation (Ingram 1971, p.79).
It appears to be rather obvious that the basic factor underlying the major difference in land
policy between the Philippines and Thailand was the difference in the culture or the value
system between Spanish colonial rulers and the rulers of the i:ndependent  kingdom. The
reason why the Dutch colonial rulers tried to preserve traditional village institutions thereby
avoiding alienation of land from peasants in Indonesia inight be their motivation to maintain
social stability for the sake of extracting tropical agricultural products from this colony at the
minimum administrative cost, as argued by Fumival (1944; 1948).
5. Agrarian Structure andAgricultural  Growth Performance
I now try to deliberate if the different agrarian structures that emerged along different
historical paths under different ecological conditions explain, at least in part, different
agricultural growth performances across Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand in recent
several decades, as outlined in Section 2. The following two questions shall be focused: First,
why did Indonesia and the Philippines, which had strong comparative advantage in tropical
cash crops such as sugar before the Second World War, lose ground to Thailand in world
market competition in recent years (Table 4 ) ?  Second, why was the agricultural output
growth of the Philippines so slow relative to Indonesia and Thailand (Table 3)?
5.  1 Losing ground ofplantations
The previous section has argued that the efficiency of the plantation relative to the peasant
system is high in the initial opening-up process of land-abundant and labor-scarce economies.
However, several negative aspects of plantations become significant as tropical economies
shift from the land-abundant to the land-scarce stage after the completion of the opening-up
process.
First, the plantation system tends to substitute capital .for  labor, because of the inherent
difficulty in supervising wage laborers in spatially dispersed anrd  ecologically diverse farm
operations as well as their relatively easy access to both private credit market and
23government's concessional loans. This substitution is socially inefficient in many developing
economies which are characterized by the abundant endowment of labor relative to capital.
Second, agricultural land tends to be cultivated less intensively in the plantation system that
employs mainly wage labor and usually practices monoculture. Complicated inter-cropping
and crop-livestock combination are more difficult to manage in the command system,
implying that both labor input and income per hectare were lower in the plantations.  '  This is
a source of inefficiency in the plantation system where land becomes scarce relative to labor
under the pressure of population growth. In contrast, small-sized family farms tend to
cultivate land more intensively.
Third, plantations usually specialize in a single crop. This bias for the production of a
monocrop reduces the flexibility of these productive organizations to respond to changing
demand by shifting to the production of other crops. Moreover, continual cropping of a single
crop tends to result in soil degradation and an increase in pest incidence. Counter application
of fertilizer and chemicals causes serious stress on environment and human health, and incur
high costs.
Fourth, the specialization of plantation workers in specific tasks inhibits the development of
their managerial and entrepreneurial capacity (Baldwin 1956; Myint 1956; Beckford 1972).
Fifth, the plantation system is a source of class conflict between laborers and
managers/capitalists. The presence of a plantation enclave in rural economies where the
peasant mode of production predominates has often strained relationships in rural
communities. In terms of the criterion of social stability, therefore, the plantation system is no
match for the system of relatively homogeneous small producers owning small assets,
however small they might be.
" Official statistics often record that yields per hectare of cash crops such as coffee and rubber are higher in
plantations than  in  small  holders.  However, these  statistics  do  not  take  into  account  various  products
intercropped with principal cash crops by  small holders, whereas monoculture  is the  common practice of
plantations.
24Although Southeast  Asia had traditionally been endowed with relatively abundant land
resources ready for exploitation, frontiers for new land opening were progressively closed
under the explosive population growth that characterized developing economies after the
Second World War.  It seems reasonable to expect the advantage of the plantation system to
have declined and that of the peasant system to have risen correspondingly. It is no wonder,
therefore, to find that Thai agriculture which predominantly consisted of smallholders began
to perform better than that of Indonesia and the Philippines characterized by the large
plantation sectors. 12 Major increases in the exports of non-rice agricultural commodities such
as rubber, kenaf and cassava tips from Thailand were totally based on smallholders'
production. It is true that the expansion in the production of non-rice export crops in Thailand
was, to a significant extent, supported by the existence of open land frontiers to enable
relatively fast increases in area under cultivation (Table  l). The important point in the present
context, however, is that the exploitation of cutivation frontiers was carried out by
smallhoders but not by plantations.
Relative increases in the efficiency of the peasant system was not limited to Thailand. The
dramatic rise in the share of Indonesia in world coffee and cocoa markets was entirely based
on smallholders (Akiyama and Nishio 1996).  Also, the production of coconut oil in the
Philippines for which this country was able to maintain its high world market share, was
extracted predominantly from copra made by smallholcders,  although some coconut
plantations continued to operate, especially in Mindanao.
The advantage of the plantation system is the better coordination between large-scale
marketing/processing and farm-level production. Yet, the disadvantage of the peasant system
12 In addition to this disadvantage, the plantation sector in post-independence Indonesia that expropriated the
estates of Dutch planters seems to have suffered from inefficiency common to state enterprises.  Several attempts
to  cure  this  problem  include  the  "nuclear  estate"  scheme  by  which  a  state  plantation  acts  as  a
marketing/processing center with a demonstration farm for technical extension, along which smallholders are
organized in a  manner similar to  contract farming.  These attempts have often been  marred by the  direct
application  of  plantations' technology  and  practice  without due  understanding of  smallholders'  conditions
(Barlow and Tomich 1991).  The case of Indonesia represents a  contrast to the relatively high efficiency of
plantations in Malaysia under private entrepreneurship. Private  plantations in Malaysia are also well supported
by the co-operative research and extension system that has been organized since the colonial period.
25in this aspect could be overcome by organizing "contract farming. "  In contract farming,
agribusiness firm manages processing and marketing but contracts for the supply of farmn
products with peasant farmers. The firm provides technical guidance, credit, and other
services to peasants in return for their pledged production to the firm. In this way the system
can take advantage of peasants in farm production without sacrificing scale economies in
processing and marketing. Advantage of this system is to tap not only the muscle labor but
also the management ability of rural people in developing economies. It was with this system
that Thailand, which began canned pineapple production relatively recently, has surpassed the
Philippines, formerly the world leading exporter, whose production is based on large
plantations in Mindanao 13
5.2 Dilemma ofland reform
We now turn to the question of how landlessness in the Philippines and land reforrn
programs aimed to solve this problem might have been related with relatively poor
performnance  of agriculture in this economy.
Attempts to mitigate social unrest rooted in pervasive landlordism in the Philippines by
means of redistributive land reform extended back to the American colonial regime, but the
framework of the reform applied in the past four decades was established by the Agrarian
Land Reform Code of 1963 enacted under President Macapagal (Hayami, Quisumbing and
Adriano 1990, ch. 3).
The major thrust of the Code was the creation of owner-cultivatorship in rice and com land.
This involves two steps: first, "Operation Leasehold," which converts share tenancy to
13  However, it needs a high degree of entrepreneurship and managerial skill to organize and operate the efficient
contract  farming system,  because it is not  easy to  enforce contracts with  a  large number  of  smallholders
concerning the quantity, quality and time of their product delivery to processing plants and/or marketing centers.
Insufficient ability and  effort of  agribusiness firms in this  regard have often  resulted in the failure  in the
operation of  contract farming.  Thus, the  performance of  contract farming has  so far been  mixed even in
Thailand (Siamwalla 1992).  The same applies to other areas including Africa where it is reported that contract
farming organized by government agencies is usually inefficient (Jaffe and Morton 1995,  pp.94-107).
26leasehold tenancy with rent fixed at the rate of 25 percent of average harvest for three normal
years preceding the Operation: second, "Operation Land Transfer," which transfers land
ownership to tenants. In the latter operation, the government expropriates land in excess of
landlords' retention limit (75 hectares) with compensating landlords with 10 percent of the
land value in cash and with the rest in interest-free redeemable Land Bank bonds. The land is
resold to the tenants for annual amortization  payments within 25 years. The Code was
amended in 1971 under President Marcos to extend land reform to the whole nation, with
automatic conversion of all share tenants to leaseholders. The 1971 Code was enforced by
Presidential Decree No. 2 and No. 27 under the Martial Law proclaimed in 1972. The
landlord's retention limit was reduced successively fromn  75 to 7 hectares. The period of
amortization  payments was shortened to 15 years. It is easy to enumerate the shortcomings of
the land reform programs in the Philippines. Yet, there is no denying that large haciendas in
Central Luzon were broken down and that most tenants established their status as leaseholders
or amortizing owners, though sizable areas remain under landlords' direct administration.
It is clear that the beneficiaries of land reform has captured a large economic surplus
because rice yields increased significantly due to irrigation development and application of
new varieties and fertilizers, while rent and amortization payments have been fixed. Thus, the
land reform has been successful in transferring much of the economic return to land from
absentee landlords to ex-sharecroppers. On the other hand, it has created serious income
inequality within village communities because no gain lhas  accrued to landless laborers whose
income has not risen or even declined because the strong population pressure on land
prevented their wages from rising despite agricultural productivity increases.
The regulatory nature of reform programs that were applied in a discriminatory manner to a
certain sector of agriculture resulted in major distortions in resource allocations. Limiting
program application so far mainly to tenanted land created a strong incentive for landlords to
evict their tenants and cultivate their land directly. However, labor inputs and, hence,
agricultural output and labor income per hectare are usually higher in small family farms than
in large farms based on hired labor because of the inherent difficulty of supervising wage
laborers in farm operations. Therefore, the exemption of land under landlords' direct
administration had the effect of reducing labor input per hectare below an optimum level,
27thereby reducing the income of labor population.
Equally serious were the regulations on tenancy contracts (especially, the prohibition of
share tenancy and the control of land rent) that reduced the incentive of large landholders to
rent out their land in small parcels, resulting in a reduction in social product and labor income.
This behavior applied not only to landlords but also to land reform beneficiaries. As the
income of former sharecroppers, who were converted into leaseholders or amortizing owners,
rose significantly, many of them retreated from arduous farm work leaving it to landless
laborers. Yet, they hesitate to sub-rent their holdings to landless laborers, because their formal
titles based on land reforn  laws shall be transferred to sub-lessees if the sub-lessees would
prove to the agrarian reform office that they are actual tillers of the land. Thus, land reform
beneficiaries have to continue to cultivate their holding based on hired labor, even if they are
not able to work because of sickness, old age or engaging in non-farm activities. Inefficient
combinations between land and labor inevitably resulted.
Negative effects of land reform on agricultural production efficiency were also significant
outside the rice and corn sector.  Although the cash crop sector has not been covered by reform
programs (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 intended to cover the cash crop
sector but not practically implemented), the fear has prevailed among plantation owners about
eventual expropriation of their land. It is only natural that they have stopped investing to
improve their land infrastructure including planting/replanting of trees. Some landowners has
even preferred to keep their land idle rather than using them for agricultural production. This
was often the case in frontier regions like Mindanao, which might underlie, to a significant
extent, the low rate of expansion in cropland area in the Philippines as compared to Thailand
(Table 1). The poor performance of the Philippines in competition for world export market
(Table 4), was clearly rooted in this great future uncertainty to the planters of tropical cash
crops concerning the future course of land reform.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I have tried to develop a broad perspective on the process by which different
agrarian structures developed in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand along different
28historical paths under different ecological conditions. Dlevelopment  of the three economies
from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century followed a typical pattern along the"
vent-for-surplus theory ", which was based on the exploitation of unused natural resources
corresponding to their integration into the world marke-t.  The resource basis of vent-for-
surplus development in Thailand representing the continental part of Southeast  Asia was the
major delta of Chao Phraya River, and that of Indonesia and the Philippines in the insular part
was tropical rain forest. This difference in the resource base underlay the major difference in
farm-size distribution - the unimodal distribution of peasants or family farms in Thailand as
compared with the coexistence of peasants and large estate farms or plantations specializing
in tropical export crops in Indonesia and the Philippines.
Further, different land policies, especially with respect to preemption of unused land by the
elite, under different political regimes resulted in major differences in the pattern of land
ownership. The preemption was wholesale in the Philippines under Spanish colonialism,
providing a basis of the highly skewed land distribution characterized by the bifurcation
between non-cultivating landlords and sharecroppers in lowland rice areas and between
plantation owners and wage laborers in upland areas. In Indonesia, the preemption took place
as the Dutch colonial government granted long-term lease of uncultivated public land for
foreign planters. However, the government tried to prevent alienation of cultivated land from
native peasants in order to avoid social instability.  As a result the peasant sector continued to
consist mainly of landlord-cum-owner and owner-cum-tenant cultivators, while both non-
cultivating landlords and the pure landless remained a minority. In Thailand also, the
preemption occurred through the grant of concessions f-or  private canal building. However, the
incidence of tenancy did not become serious, because the government of the independent
kingdom preserved the traditional institution of giving land to anyone who could open and
cultivate it. The rural sector of Thailand continued to be dominated by relatively
homogeneous land-owning peasants.
It appears that such major differences in the agrarian structure are a significant factor
underlying differences in the agricultural growth performance across the three economies in
recent years.  As frontiers for opening new land for cultivation were progressively closed, the
initial advantage of the plantation system in large-scale land development including
29infrastructure began to be out-weighed by its disadvantage in monitoring hired labor, and the
advantage of the peasant system based on family labor needing no supervision to rise. This
tendency seems to be manifested in the growing shares of Thailand in the world exports of
tropical cash crops in recent years, in which Indonesia and the Philippines used to have
traditional comparative advantage. Furthermore, the programs of land reforrn in the
Philippines that were called for reducing inequality in the distribution of land ownership have
made land markets inactive, resulting in major distortions in resource allocations and serious
under-investment in agriculture.
Of course, there are many factors other than agrarian structure, which would have
contributed to the differential performances of agriculture. For example, one factor commonly
cited to explain the poor growth performance of Philippine agriculture is the prolonged
continuation of industrial protection policy geared for import substitution. Under this policy
regime the agricultural sector was penalized by high tariffs on manufactured commodities and
overvalued exchange rates (Ariff and Hill 1985; Bautista 1987). Other obvious factors
include state trade monopoly on sugar and coconut products heavily tinted with cronyism in
the late stage of the Marcos regime(Hayami, Quisumbing, Adriano 1990, pp.1 15-6), and the
political instability in the 1980s from the downfall of the Marcos administration throughout
the succeeding Aquino regime that discouraged both domestic and foreign investments.
However, these factors may not be independent of the agrarian structure. For example, Hara
(1994, pp.370-72) advanced a hypothesis on the reason why the import-substitution-
industrialization was pursued more strongly for a longer period in the Philippines than the
other ASEAN economies. He argued that in the Philippines the business elite who benefited
from industrial protection originated from the landed oligarch and, therefore, little
countervailing power was mobilized against industrial protection policy. In contrast, the rural
countervailing power was comparatively high in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, because
the urban business elite were predominantly ethnic Chinese.
Similarly, current policy choice may be significantly conditioned by the historical path in
the formation of agrarian structure. For example, remarkable success in the Green Revolution
in Indonesia underlying the highest growth of land productivity among the three economies
30under study for the past three decades was, to a large extent, based on the Suharto
administration's strong supports on the rice sector through investment in irrigation,
agricultural research, and extension plus subsidies on inputs and credits. These supports were
effective in overcoming the "Dutch disease effects" that seriotusly  damaged agriculture in
some oil-producing countries such as Nigeria in the 1970s to the early 1980s (Hayami 1997,
pp.101-02).  It does  not appear  that Suharto's  policy  choice  was independent  of the tradition
in Indonesia since long before its independence to protect peasants as the stabilizing block of
society.
As it stands now, such political-economy theorizing is no more than mere conjecture. Yet,
the agrarian structure of a nation that  has been created along a unique historical path under a
unique ecological condition should have a far-reaching influence on the value system in its
society and the organization of its political economy and, hence, on policy choice. The
positive analysis into the relationship between the historically-determined agrarian structures
and the current courses of political economy remains to be the major challenge in future
research.
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34Table  1.  Land  endowments  for agricultural  production  in Inodonesia,  Philippines,  and  Thailand,  1965-96.
Indonesia  Philippines
1965  1996  1996/65  1965  1996  1996/65  1965
ratio  ratio
No. of farm  workers  (1000)a  29006  47713  1.64  7363  12128  1.65  1245(
Croplandb:
Total  (0OOha)  26000  30987  1.19  6660  9520  1.42  1260f
Per  capita  (ha)  0.24  0.15  0.63  0.21  0.14  0.67  0.4-
Per  farm  worker  (ha)  0.90  0.65  0.72  0.90  0.78  0.87  1.0
Pecentage  of cropland  (%):
Lowland  paddyfieldc  n.a.  27  n.a.  n.a.  32  n.a.  n.a
Upland  annual  crop  landd  n.a.  31  n.a.  n.a.  22  n.a.  n.a
Land  under  permanent  crop  31  42  1.35  38  46  1.21  l-
a Economically  active  population
'Arable land  area plus  area under  permanent  crop
C Lowland  paddyfield  areas  pertain  to 1995  in Indonesia,  1991  in the Philippines  and 1993  in Thailand.
d Arabte  land  area  minus  lowland  paddyfield  area
Source:  FAOSTAT  data base except  for lowland  paddyfield  areas  which are taken from Indonesian
Statistical  Yearbook  1996  for Indonesia  (8,484,000  ha in 1995),  Philippine  Statistical  Yearbook  1998
for the Philippines  (3,001,000  ha in 1991)  and  Agricultural  S,tatistics  1995/96  for Thailand  (10,934,000
ha in 1993).
35Table 2:  The distribution of operational farm size and the incidence of agricultural tenancy in  Indonesia,
Philippines  and Thailand.
Indonesia  Philippines  Thailand
Year  of survey  1973  1971  1978
Average  operational  farm size (ha)  1.1  3.6  3.7
Percentage  of farms and farmland
Below 5 ha:
Farms  98  85  72
Land area  69  48  39
Above  5 ha:
Farms  Oa  0.2  oa
Land area  14  14  0.9
Gini coefficient  of land concentration  0.56  0.51  0.45
Percentage  of tenanted area in total farmland
Pure  tenancy  2  21  6
Totalb  24  33  16
Percentage  of share  tenancy in tenanted land  60  79  29
a. Less than 0.05 percent
b. Area in pure tenancy  farms plus area in owner-cum-tenant  farms.
Source: Hayami  and Otsuka (1993, pp. 10-11)  based mainly on UN-FAO, 1970 Worid Census of Agriculture:
Analysis and Comparison  of the Results,  Rome, 1971.
36Tabie  3. Growth  of agricultural  production  om Indonesia,  Philippines,  and Thailand,  1961-95.
Growth  rate (%/year)
Index  1961-65  to  1976-80  to  1961-65  to
1961-65  1976-80  1991-95  1976-80  1991-95  1991-95
Indonesia
Total  100  157  309  3.0  4.5  3.8
Per capita  100  111  165  0.7  2.6  1.7
Per farm worker  100  138  232  2.1  3.5  2.8
Per haa  100  157  263  3.0  3.4  3.2
Philippines
Total  100  177  239  3.8  2.0  2.9
Per capita  100  116  111  1.0  -0.3  0.3
Perfarm worker  100  134  156  2.0  1.0  1.5
Per haa  100  137  165  2.1  1.2  1.7
Tha land
Total  100  190  277  4.3  2.5  3.4
Per capita  100  123  140  1.4  0.9  1.1
Per farm worker  100  145  199  2.5  2.1  2.3
Per haa  100  129  163  1.7  1.6  1.6
a per hectare  of cropland  ( arable land plus land under permanent  crop)
Source:  FAOSTAT  database
37Table 4:  Shares of net exports  in world total export value  of selected  agricultural  commodities  in
Indonesia,  Philippines,  and Thailand,  1961-1995.
Share  in world  market
1961-65  1976-80  1991-95
Rice
Indonesia  -11.0  -17.6  -3.5
Philippines  -3.1  0.5  -0.3
Thailand  19.4  18.7  26.1
Maize
Indonesia  -0.1  -0.1  -0.8
Philippines  0  -0.2  -0.1
Thailand  3.6  2.9  0.3
Sugara
Indonesia  0.3  -1.4  -1.1
Philippines  7.3  4.0  0.6
Thailand  0.2  2.7  6.9
Coffeeb
Indonesia  1.0  4.5  4.9
Philippines  0  0.3  0
Thailand  -0.1  0  0.8
Coconut  Oil
Indonesia  0  -1.0  15.8
Philippines  39.8  69.4  60.4
Thailand  -0.1  -0.2  0
Palm  Oil
Indonesia  17.8  14.5  13.9
Philippines  -0.9  -0.1  -0.1
Thailand  0  -0.6  0
Rubber
Indonesia  23.3  23.7  27.9
Philippines  -0.3  0.1  0.3
Thailand  8.8  12.9  32.6
Pineapplec
Indonesia  0  0  7.8
Philippines  12.9  20.7  15.0
Thailand  0  16.9  45.9
Banana
Indonesia  0  0  0.1
Philippines  0  8.0  5.4
Thailand  0.1  0.1  0
a  Sugar  raw equivalent
b  Coffee green  and  roast
c Canned  pineapple
Source:  FAOSTAT database.
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